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Summary 
 
Large-scale field experiments on tax compliance have been a thriving field of research in 
many regions of the world. However, Africa is still lagging behind, as administrative data from 
anonymised returns is available only in a handful of countries. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is as yet no published evidence of a tax field experiment from Africa. This paper reports 
the results of a pilot experiment in Rwanda that served as a stepping stone for a larger 
experimental study on tax compliance. In this pilot, we test the process of messaging 
taxpayers to encourage them to comply voluntarily, by providing information on sanctions. 
The results indicate that communication strategies that aim to inform taxpayers may be 
effective in increasing tax compliance. However, these results are only indicative. They will 
be complemented by further evidence from the larger field experiment, where we test 
different types of messages and delivery methods. Nonetheless, this paper provides some 
initial insight into the use of tax experiments in Africa, both in terms of initial evidence and 
lessons learned for future efforts in this field.  
 
Keywords: taxation; voluntary compliance; field experiment; Rwanda. 
 
JEL codes: C93, H26, H30 
 
 
 
Giulia Mascagni is Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and 
Research Director of the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD).  
 
Christopher Nell is Research Officer at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and the 
International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD).  
 
Nara Monkam is Research Director of the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF).  
 
Denis Mukama is Head of Research at the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA).  
  
4 
 
Contents 
 
Summary          3 
Acknowledgements         5 
Acronyms          5 
Introduction          6 
 
1 Context and research design       7 
 1.1 The Rwandan context       7 
 1.2 Research design        8 
 1.3  Sample and randomisation       10 
  
2 Implementation and lessons learned on tax experiments in Africa  12 
  
3 Empirical strategy         14 
  
4 Data and description of revisions        15 
 4.1 Revisions         16 
 
5 Econometric results         17 
 5.1 Robustness and caveats        21 
 
6 Conclusions          22 
 
 Appendices 
Appendix A  Experimental letter       23 
Appendix B  Description of variables      25 
Appendix C  Balance tests of treatment and control groups   25 
 Appendix D  Initial tests and LATE results       26 
Appendix E  Robustness tests       27 
 
 References          30 
 
Tables 
Table 1 Revisions in the year 2014 (before our intervention)    17 
Table 2 Regression results (ITT)       19 
Table B.1  Summary of variables used in the regression analysis   25 
Table C.1  Balance tests of treatment and control groups at baseline   25 
Table D.1  Differences in the number of revisers     26 
Table D.2  Differences in the amount of revised tax     26 
Table D.3  LATE analysis         27 
Table E.1  Tobit analysis without missing values     27 
Table E.2 ITT analysis with four-month window      28 
Table E.3  LATE analysis with four-month window     29 
 
Figures 
Figure A.1  Front of the letter         23 
Figure A.2  Back of the letter        24 
 
  
5 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
This paper is part of a broader project on tax compliance in Rwanda carried out jointly by the 
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and the International Centre for Tax and 
Development (ICTD), in collaboration with the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). We are 
extremely grateful to these institutions for the support they have provided throughout the 
project, including financial support. We are particularly thankful to the staff of the RRA for 
their invaluable inputs and assistance that made this project possible. Special thanks are due 
to the RRA’s Commissioner General Mr Richard Tusabe, the RRA’s Deputy Commissioner 
General Mr Pascal Ruganintwali, the RRA’s Deputy Commissioner for Research and 
Planning Mme Agnes Kanyangeyo, and the other Deputy Commissioners who provided 
assistance and feedback throughout the project. We are also very grateful to John 
Karangwa, Gaudence Uwimana, Lucie Niyigena, Naphtal Hakizimana and the entire 
research and planning unit, as well as Mme Hajara Batamuliza and all auditors involved in 
the letter delivery. The paper benefited from comments provided by participants to the 5th 
ICTD Annual Meeting in February 2016, a workshop with RRA staff in July 2016, the African 
Tax Research Network (ATRN) Conference in September 2016, as well as several 
consultations with RRA staff. We also acknowledge the valuable inputs provided by Lucio 
Castro to the research design and by Laura Paler throughout the project. Finally, we thank 
Carlos Scartascini and Jorge Garcia Hombrados for their useful comments.  
 
 
Acronyms 
 
ATAF   African Tax Administration Forum  
ATRN   African Tax Research Network  
CIT   Corporate Income Tax  
ICTD   International Centre for Tax and Development  
ITT  Intention-To-Treat 
IV  Instrumental Variable 
LATE  Local Average Treatment Effect 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
PAYE   Pay As You Earn  
PIT   Personal income tax  
RA  Revenue Authority 
RRA   Rwanda Revenue Authority  
RWF  Rwandan Franc 
VAT   Value Added Tax 
  
6 
 
Introduction  
 
The literature on tax compliance has recently seen a surge of evidence from field 
experiments. Field experiments use administrative data from taxpayers’ records to evaluate 
the effectiveness of communication strategies that revenue administrations can adopt to 
increase compliance. These strategies typically take the form of letters delivered to 
taxpayers, which aim to provide information on the tax system or to change perceptions on 
key determinants of tax compliance, such as deterrence or fiscal exchange. Revenue 
authorities play a key role in this type of study, both in providing data from anonymised 
taxpayer records and in implementing the intervention. From a theoretical standpoint, most 
studies of tax compliance are based on the seminal model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
and its subsequent developments.1 Generally, tax compliance behaviour is determined by a 
mix of enforcement measures, such as audits and the effective use of third-party data, and 
quasi-voluntary compliance, which is motivated by factors often labelled as ‘tax morale’,2 
such as trust in institutions, social norms, fiscal exchange, and moral factors. One could think 
about deterrence measures as the ‘stick’, while measures to encourage voluntary 
compliance would be the ‘carrot’. In practice, these theoretical elements interact in complex 
ways with individual characteristics (e.g. sector, employment status, gender) and with 
practical aspects of the taxpaying environment (e.g. corruption of tax collectors, accessibility 
of information, availability and quality of tax advisers). Field experiments test empirically 
which factors affect tax compliance in practice (for a detailed review, see Mascagni 2016).  
 
Although field experiments on tax compliance have been thriving in many regions of the 
world, low-income countries remain under-represented and Africa is still completely absent 
from this literature. Therefore, we do not know whether the findings of the existing literature 
are valid also for African countries, or even if carrying out field experiments is feasible at all 
in the continent. Challenges that are specific to low-income countries may make this type of 
study particularly difficult in those contexts. From a practical point of view, low administrative 
capacity is a challenge for studies that require a high degree of commitment and involvement 
by the local revenue administration (RA). The use of taxpayer records for research, even if 
anonymised, is still rare in Africa – making many RAs unwilling or unable to grant access 
(Mascagni, Monkam and Nell 2016a). Moreover, taxpayer registries are often not kept up-to-
date, making it potentially very hard to trace taxpayers to physical addresses to deliver 
messages to them. These challenges may cast doubts even on the appropriateness of the 
most common delivery method for messages, physical letters, in a low-income context. In 
other words, the standard research design developed for high-income countries may not be 
suitable for low-income countries. On a more conceptual level, these countries present some 
specific features that make the problem of tax compliance somewhat more complex than in 
high-income countries. Some of the most notable ones are typically large informal sectors, 
weak enforcement, and low level and quality of service delivery.  
 
In this context, this paper reports the findings of a pilot experiment which has been used 
primarily to test the feasibility of larger-scale field experiments in Africa, and which has 
served as a stepping stone for a larger experimental study on tax compliance carried out in 
Rwanda.3 The pilot has also enabled us to get initial insights on the effectiveness of nudges 
to improve tax compliance. As a pilot, this experiment did not aim to address the conceptual 
issues that make low-income countries different to their high-income counterparts, nor to 
provide conclusive results on tax compliance. Instead, our main motivation is to explore the 
practical aspects of carrying out tax experiments in Africa, as this pilot represents the first 
                                                        
1 For example, see Yitzaki 1974; Erard and Feinstein 1994; Myles and Naylor 1996; and Traxler 2010.  
2 For a detailed discussion of the elements composing tax morale, see the review paper by Luttmer and Singhal (2014).  
3 The findings of this larger study are reported in Mascagni, Nell and Monkam 2016b.  
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publicly available evidence from an African country.4 In doing so, we are still able to provide 
some initial results on the effectiveness of communication strategies as nudges to increase 
tax compliance. The results and lessons learned presented here fed into the design of a 
larger-scale, and more complex, field experiment testing the effectiveness of different 
messages (reminder of deadlines, deterrence, fiscal exchange) and delivery methods 
(letters, emails, SMS) to increase tax compliance in Rwanda (Mascagni, Nell and Monkam 
2016b).  
 
Although our intervention is a physical letter, as in other similar studies, we depart from the 
literature by looking at taxpayers’ voluntary revisions of their accounts rather than payments 
or declarations. Therefore our econometric results are not directly comparable with other 
studies, but can only speak to the rest of the literature in general terms. More specifically, the 
content of our letters should nudge taxpayers into making a revision to correct their tax 
account. The letters do so by providing information on the relevant Rwandan laws, which 
provide for sanctions as high as 60 per cent if under-reported income is found through an 
audit, but much lower, about 10 per cent, if the taxpayer voluntarily revises their tax account. 
Two interrelated issues motivate our focus on revisions. First, taxpayer collaboration is 
particularly important in low-income countries, where tax authorities face particularly severe 
administrative and financial constraints. Second, even when taxpayers want to come forward 
and report previously undeclared income, they may not be able to do so because of high 
sanctions or lack of information on the legal consequences. In this context our letters may 
provide a cost effective way to encourage them to revise their account, while benefiting from 
lower fines that they might not have been aware of.  
 
Our results confirm that in low-income countries, messages can nudge taxpayers into 
complying more, just as they can in high-income countries. The letters affected small 
taxpayers’ behaviour in particular, whereas large ones did not seem to respond to our 
treatment. In this pilot we cannot offer more detailed results, for example on revenue gains or 
on the channel for our effect, because of limitations inherent to the pilot nature of this study – 
chief amongst these are the need to keep the analysis as simple as possible, and the 
relatively small sample at hand. Therefore, even if econometric results are reported in this 
paper, we give more emphasis to the lessons learned on implementing field experiments in 
Africa.  
 
 
1 Context and research design 
 
1.1 The Rwandan context  
 
With a population of about 11 million, Rwanda is a relatively small landlocked country within 
the East African Community. Its small size is not only relevant as an element of context, but 
also because of its implications for tax collection. With a smaller number of taxpayers than 
most other countries in Africa and a smaller geographical area to control, the country may 
provide an easier environment to enforce effective tax collection. This potential advantage is 
reflected in a tax to GDP ratio of about 15 per cent,5 which is in line with the average of low-
income countries despite the absence of natural resources, and a relatively high reliance on 
income taxes (about a third of total tax),6 which are usually seen as harder to collect than 
trade or indirect taxes. The total number of taxpayers in Rwanda amounted to fewer than 
50,000 in 2014. The value added tax (VAT) and Pay As You Earn (PAYE) are the two most 
                                                        
4 We understand that other experiments are being carried out in other African countries, but to the best of our knowledge the 
results are not yet publicly available.  
5 Source: ATAF 2016.  
6 For a more detailed overview of the Rwandan tax system, see Mascagni et al. 2016a.  
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important tax types in terms of revenues, accounting for 34 per cent and 25 per cent, 
respectively, of the tax take (see Mascagni et al. 2016a for more details). Despite being 
generally a tax success story, Rwanda still faces many of the typical challenges of low-
income countries: a large informal sector, widespread evasion and avoidance, and 
administrative constraints in government institutions. Schneider and Williams (2013) estimate 
that the informal economy in Rwanda accounted for roughly 40 per cent of national income 
between 1999 and 2006, while the informal economy labour force as a share of the official 
labour force was 75 per cent in 1998 (the latest available figures). From a taxpayer’s 
perspective, the tax system still represents a burden both in terms of tax payments and in 
terms of administrative procedures. The Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) has implemented 
a number of measures to facilitate tax compliance, such as a system for e-filing, a mobile 
platform for small businesses, electronic billing machines and, more broadly, outreach 
activities to sensitise and educate taxpayers.  
 
Recognising the importance of voluntary compliance, the RRA applies different sanctions on 
under-declared incomes depending on whether they are uncovered through an audit or 
through a voluntary disclosure by the taxpayer. While in the former case taxpayers can face 
fines of up to 60 per cent of the undeclared income, in the latter case they would only be 
liable to a 10 per cent late payment sanction. Taxpayers can only benefit from the lower 
sanction if they revise their tax account before they receive an audit notification. Seven days 
before the actual audit begins, RRA staff personally deliver the audit notifications and 
taxpayers need to confirm receipt by signing a return slip. If a taxpayer makes any changes 
in the tax declaration after an audit has been notified, they are subject to the higher fines.  
 
Although these sanctions are included in the laws, which are available on the RRA website, it 
is likely that many taxpayers are either not aware of such details or need to be reminded of 
the benefits of self-rectification. As explained in more detail in the next section, our 
experiment exploits this feature to test whether providing this information can have a positive 
effect on compliance, measured through voluntary revisions.  
 
1.2 Research design 
 
Our intervention is in line with the tax experiments literature, as it is a letter aimed at 
changing the information set and perceptions, rather than the actual parameters of the tax 
system (e.g. tax rate, probability of detection). We employ an encouragement design, in 
which the letter contains information on the legal provisions related to sanctions, as set out in 
the Rwandan tax code and summarised above. As shown in Appendix A, the information was 
printed on two sides. The front side is the body of the letter, highlighting the importance of 
correctly reporting taxes and informing taxpayers that the RRA can apply fines for incorrect 
declarations. To make the message more salient, the letter includes the following example:  
 
“If your due tax is 2,000,000 Rwandan Francs (RWF) (US$2,444) but you have only 
declared 1,000,000 RWF (US$1,222), you will have to pay the outstanding due tax of 
1,000,000 RWF (US$1,222). In addition, in case of an audit, you will be subject to a 
fine of 600,000 RWF (US$733) (plus interest). However, if you correct your due tax 
voluntarily before you are notified of an audit, the fine will only be 100,000 RWF 
(US$122) (plus interest).” 
 
The amount used in this example, two million Rwandan Francs (RWF) (US$2,444), was 
chosen to be close to the average corporate income tax due in Rwanda. One potential issue 
from mentioning a specific amount is that taxpayers may then feel encouraged to revise by 
exactly that amount. Although we could have randomised the numbers used in the example, 
we opted against it to keep the letter preparation process as simple as possible during this 
pilot (see discussion of implementation challenges in Section 2). In addition to the example, 
the main body of the letter also includes some information about how to contact the RRA in 
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case the taxpayer wants to receive more details or ask any questions. The back of the letter 
includes a table where the sanctions are explained in more detail, each case including an 
example similar to the one reported in the body of the letter and reflecting the different fine 
rates.  
 
The behaviour that we seek to nudge with this letter is for taxpayers to voluntarily revise their 
tax accounts. We capture this with two outcome variables – the probability of revising and the 
amount of revisions – as discussed in more detail in Section 4.1. As noted earlier, this is a 
different outcome variable than the rest of the literature that usually looks at tax payments or 
declarations.  
 
Since voluntary revisions can only benefit from lower sanctions if they are made before an 
audit notification, we had to time our intervention according to the RRA’s normal audit 
schedule. In particular, we wanted to give taxpayers a reasonable window between the 
receipt of our letter and the beginning of possible audits. As summarised in Figure 1, the 
RRA normally plans the audits yearly in an audit plan that usually enters into force in July. 
Although in principle audits can start any time after July, in practice most of them are carried 
out in the latter part of the audit period, which lasts until the following June. In particular, the 
first few months right after the adoption of the audit plan are usually dedicated to wrapping 
up the audits from the previous audit period, so a very small proportion of new audits are 
carried out then. Therefore, in our original design we planned to use this window to send out 
our letters, as shown in Figure 1. Although we did not give a time window to taxpayers to 
respond, as there is none set out in the law, we expected any reaction to occur relatively 
quickly after receipt of the letter. Therefore, sending the letters shortly after July would have 
allowed for a five-month window for reactions before the beginning of the tax filing period on 
1 January. Although there is no direct link between revisions and declarations, ideally we 
wanted to avoid any overlap that could possibly confound the results.  
 
Figure 1: Experiment timeline  
 
 
To make sure the message was received as clearly and as easily as possible, each taxpayer 
received the letter in the three languages spoken in Rwanda: English, French, and 
Kinyarwanda. Moreover, we tried to keep the text as simple as possible and to include a 
clear subject line to the letter (“Avoid additional fines by voluntarily correcting your tax 
declaration before you are notified of an audit”). To make the intervention credible and 
realistic, each letter was stamped with the official RRA stamp and signed by the RRA’s 
Commissioner General. Since this was an official letter in all respects, the contents were 
developed in close collaboration with the RRA and approved by the Legal Department to 
ensure they accurately reflected and respected all relevant laws.  
 
The experiment involved only one treatment, the letter described above and reported in 
Appendix A, with the counterfactual being a control group that received no letter. Although 
this design allows us to rigorously evaluate the effect of the letter, we cannot establish 
whether reactions are due to the content of the letter or to the fact of receiving any letter from 
the revenue authority. To distinguish between the two mechanisms (i.e. specific contents, or 
any letter) we would need to compare the treatment letter to a control letter, with some 
general content about RRA activities, in addition to the no-letter control group. However, this 
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was not possible in our case because of the limited sample available to us, with a maximum 
of 1,000 letters to be sent and some uncertainty about the success rate of the delivery 
process. Other studies have found that the very fact of receiving any letter may indeed 
trigger a reaction by taxpayers (for example, see Del Carpio 2014). So any effect that we 
detect may occur through either or both of the following two channels: 1) receiving any letter 
from the revenue authority, which may increase both the perceived probability of being 
caught and the perception of the effort being put into enforcement; and 2) the content of the 
letter, which should encourage taxpayers to come forward thanks to lower sanctions. The 
weakness of our design is that we cannot distinguish between these two channels. However, 
the reaction that we are trying to identify in our case requires a specific action (i.e. a revision) 
rather than a general change in behaviour (e.g. more attention being paid in the process of 
filing the tax declaration). Although this does not fully solve the problem, it makes it 
somewhat easier to connect taxpayers’ reactions to the specific contents of the letter.  
 
1.3 Sample and randomisation  
 
Taxpayers included in our experiment were randomly selected from the total population of 
taxpayers in Rwanda. We applied three broad criteria to select taxpayers who would be 
eligible to be part of the experiment. First, we restricted the experiment to taxpayers 
registered in one of the tax offices of Kigali Province. Still, some of them may operate outside 
the capital despite being registered there. The reasons for this choice are largely practical. 
Sending messages outside Kigali was expected to be much more challenging and harder to 
monitor from the RRA Research Division, our main partner based in the headquarters. 
Although over half of taxpayers are based outside Kigali, they only contribute 14 per cent to 
total tax – which supports the hypothesis that it is harder to reach them. Moreover, taxpayers 
outside of Kigali are much less likely to be audited than those registered in the capital.7  
 
Second, we mostly chose taxpayers who we could observe in the baseline year, 2014. The 
only exception to this general rule is a group of twelve taxpayers from the audited group (see 
below), for whom we chose 2013 or 2012 as a baseline comparison. The requirement was 
relaxed for the audited taxpayers, because the low numbers in this group pushed us to retain 
as many as possible. Since none of these twelve taxpayers made a revision in the period 
considered, the fact that we use a different baseline year for them does not affect our results.  
 
Third, we only considered taxpayers who pay three main tax types: VAT, corporate income 
tax (CIT), and personal income tax (PIT). In the context of Rwanda, two clarifications are 
needed to understand the sample composition. First, PIT refers to the income of individual 
businesses and the self-employed, rather than employees, who are subject to Pay As You 
Earn (PAYE). Second, VAT taxpayers here are intended as those who withhold the taxes 
(i.e. sellers or traders) rather than the downstream buyers or consumers that ultimately pay 
the tax. By selecting these three tax types, we are considering those taxpayers, both 
individuals and companies, that need to actively file a declaration to pay taxes and that 
therefore have a larger margin to under-declare their income.8  
 
Based on these eligibility rules, the experiment sample includes 2,000 taxpayers who 
belonged to the following groups. 
1. 1,000 risky taxpayers, divided in two sub-groups as follows: 
a. 296 audited taxpayers who were audited in 2015-2016, based on the RRA’s 
audit plan. This number was fixed, so we selected all of them.  
                                                        
7 See Mascagni et al. 2016a. 
8 It is well known that those who only receive income from wages have hardly any margin to evade taxes, since they are 
withheld from their salaries by employers (see for example Kelven et al. 2011).  
11 
 
b. 704 risky taxpayers who were not audited in 2015-16, but are still considered 
risky based on RRA’s criteria for risk management and audit selection (more 
details below).  
2. 1,000 non-risky taxpayers randomly selected from the general population.  
 
The only group that included a fixed, and relatively limited, number of individuals is the one of 
audited taxpayers. The group includes both taxpayers who are subject to a comprehensive 
audit of all their operations and to an issue audit including only a specific tax type or fiscal 
year.  
 
Risky taxpayers were included based on a list provided by the RRA, complemented with 
additional taxpayers selected based on RRA’s criteria to define riskiness, which fed into the 
first step of the audit selection process. More specifically, we selected taxpayers based on 
the following criteria, which we weighted using the same weighting used by the RRA in the 
audit selection process: size; additional tax obtained from previous audits; difference 
between turnover as declared for CIT and for VAT; profitability; and frequency of audits in the 
past.  
 
The 2,000 taxpayers in our sample were then randomly assigned to the control (no letter) 
and treatment group (who received the letter). Assignment was based on stratification to 
make sure that the two groups were balanced on key variables that were expected to matter 
for the results. More specifically, we used four variables for stratification. The first one is a 
measure of riskiness, indicating whether a taxpayer is audited, risky, or non-risky. The 
second one is the size of the taxpayer, based on whether the RRA categorises the taxpayer 
as small or large.9 This categorisation is likely to include both considerations on size and on 
enforcement capacity. Thirdly, we used a geographical variable indicating whether the 
taxpayer is registered in the city of Kigali or elsewhere in Kigali Province. Finally, we 
considered previous revision behaviour, seeking a balance between those who made 
revisions in the previous year and those who did not.  
 
Given some challenges in implementation, described in more detail in Section 2, we had to 
make two small changes in our sample after our original design but before implementation – 
i.e. before any letter was sent to taxpayers. The first one is the replacement of eight non-
risky taxpayers, due to unavailability of contact information in the RRA database. They were 
replaced with taxpayers from the same strata as the ones who were dropped, thus 
preserving balance. The second one is a reorganisation of the treatment and control groups 
for the audited taxpayers. This was necessary because delays in implementation meant that 
some taxpayers in the audited group had already received the audit notification, therefore 
invalidating our letter (i.e. those taxpayers would not have a chance to revise at a lower 
sanction any more). Twenty-eight taxpayers were in this situation and were excluded from 
the sample. To keep balanced control and treatment groups, we randomly reallocated 
taxpayers from the same strata to the two groups. The final allocation was still balanced both 
regarding the key variables and sample size, as confirmed by the statistical tests reported in 
Appendix C.  
 
 
  
                                                        
9 Throughout this paper, we will refer to taxpayers as ‘large’ if they are classified in the top-medium or large taxpayer office at 
the RRA, and as ‘small’ otherwise.  
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2 Implementation and lessons learned on tax 
experiments in Africa  
 
Based on the contents described in Section 1.2, all letters were prepared by RRA staff. The 
process of letter preparation was in practice more burdensome and time consuming than 
expected, because until now the RRA has not used letters extensively as a mean to 
communicate with taxpayers. The preparation process involved the following tasks, which 
were performed according to RRA standard procedures: letter translation in three languages, 
legal check of contents, signature of the Commissioner General on each letter, printing on 
RRA letterhead paper, stamping with the official RRA stamp, and manual filling in of 
taxpayers’ names and addresses on each letter and envelope. Although we contacted 1,000 
taxpayers, making letters available in three languages meant having to prepare 3,000 letters. 
The process was coordinated by the RRA’s Research Department, which includes a limited 
number of staff members who were aided in this task by interns and students hired 
specifically for this purpose.  
 
All letters were eventually ready in early September 2015 and were transferred to auditors for 
delivery, which happened within three days between 9 and 11 September.10 Auditors asked 
for a confirmation of receipt from the taxpayers, in the form of a signed copy of the letter – 
one of the three identical copies that each received in three languages (as shown in 
Appendix A). Delivering letters was a challenging task, mainly due to the fact that the RRA 
taxpayer registry is not fully up-to-date, so it was impossible to reach all taxpayers 
successfully just by relying on the addresses available to the RRA. This meant that all 
taxpayers had to be contacted by phone on the day of delivery to confirm the address and, in 
some cases, to make sure someone would be available to receive the letter and sign a 
confirmation. The most common reasons for failed delivery were related to inactive phone 
numbers, wrong numbers, or phones being switched off. There were also some cases where 
the taxpayer refused to receive the letter.  
 
The choice of delivering letters through auditors was based both on our desire to follow 
standard RRA procedures to make our letters fully credible, and on practical considerations. 
Relying on a private mail company would have posed two challenges. First, it would have 
risked breaching taxpayer confidentiality since phone numbers would need to be disclosed to 
a third party. Second, no private company would have the skills, information, and experience 
that auditors have in tracing individual taxpayers, as they deal with them on a day-to-day 
basis. This specific expertise was crucial in making sure most letters were delivered 
successfully. Clearly the drawback of this feature, as anticipated in Section 1.2, is that in this 
pilot experiment we cannot identify whether the observed effects are due to the letter’s 
contents or to the contact with RRA officials, which makes the probability of detection more 
salient. In other words, our design does not allow us to distinguish whether revisions are 
driven by the perceived threat through the delivery of letters by RRA auditors, the information 
about the level of the fines, or a combination of the two effects. In order to disentangle these 
effects, we would have required a control message without information on fines. The larger-
scale experiment (Mascagni et al. 2016b), for which this study is a pilot, explores these 
issues in full detail.  
 
Eventually, 589 letters were successfully delivered, representing about 60 per cent of the 
original treatment group. Compared to similar studies in middle-income countries, this 
compliance rate is actually relatively high. For example, a recent experiment in Colombia 
obtained a compliance rate of 38 per cent for similar letters (Ortega and Scartascini 2016). 
Thanks to the delivery confirmation reports, in the majority of cases we know exactly who 
                                                        
10 In a few rare cases, letter delivery required a follow up the following week.  
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received the letter and who did not. Not surprisingly, the group of taxpayers who received the 
letters (‘compliers’) differs significantly from the group of taxpayers who did not receive the 
letters (the control group and taxpayers in the treatment group for whom letter delivery was 
not successful – ‘non-compliers’). Although the original allocation into treatment and control 
groups was random, the actual group of compliers is a selected sample. For example, non-
risky taxpayers were less likely to be compliant with the original randomisation (i.e. less likely 
to have actually received the letters); while taxpayers subject to VAT and CIT were more 
likely to have received the letters. Since we can accurately identify the compliers, this 
endogeneity issue can be partly addressed in the regression analysis using instrumental 
variables (IV) (see Section 3).  
 
On a more general level, the implementation of this pilot experiment provided at least four 
broad lessons learned. The first one is related to the great constraints in terms of staff 
capacity that the RRA faces, like most other revenue authorities. For example, our main 
partner, the research unit, has only five staff members, although they work closely with an 
additional team of about five in the planning and statistics unit. This pilot was possible thanks 
to the high degree of commitment and invaluable support from our partners at the RRA. 
However, the implementation of the experiment did represent a substantial burden both on 
the research division and on the auditors’ teams. In some cases, the revenue gains from 
experiments like the one reported here would counterbalance this burden. Still, researchers 
need to be aware that this type of study represents a challenging task on the revenue 
administration’s side, which may not be feasible in countries where there is a lower level of 
commitment or organisational capacity than in Rwanda. The first step of any field experiment 
should therefore be a thorough assessment of the level of buy-in and commitment from the 
local partner at all levels – from the Commissioner General to the officers who are involved in 
the smallest details of implementation. When these conditions are not in place, researchers 
should expect a high possibility of failure.  
 
Secondly, many revenue authorities in Africa, including the RRA, do not use letters to 
communicate with taxpayers as commonly as in high-income countries. Therefore, 
processes to do so are not efficient and the necessary infrastructure is often not in place – 
starting with reliable addresses for taxpayers. An additional implication is that we had to rely 
on auditors for letter delivery, generating a burden for the RRA and potentially confounding 
our results, for example due to uncertainty on the interaction between taxpayers and 
auditors.11 Moreover, this means a potentially high rate of non-compliance with the treatment, 
and delays in implementation, which can crucially affect the study when timing is fixed due to 
specific deadlines for taxpaying. In our case, the timing constraint came from the rolling out 
of the audit plan, which meant that our sample could potentially become smaller with time. In 
facing these challenges, our pilot study triggered some changes in RRA’s internal processes. 
For example, the procedure to personalise letters, which was manual in this pilot experiment, 
will be done electronically in the future, including in our main experiment. This study also 
sensitised the revenue administration about the importance of personalising letters with 
taxpayers’ names, to make sure the message is more salient and effective (in line with the 
behavioural economics literature, for example see BIT 2012).  
 
Thirdly, one of the biggest challenges we encountered was related to shortcomings in the 
taxpayers’ registry. This is an issue that affects the RRA more widely than just for this 
research project, as well as affecting many other tax administrations in low-income countries. 
A process to update the registry is ongoing but is proving very challenging due to the 
massive work needed initially to clear the backlog, as well as the need for constant updating. 
In this context, our experiment may support these efforts thanks to the information collected 
in the process of delivering letters, which can feed back to the registry. The main lesson 
                                                        
11 However, auditors were instructed to only deliver the letter and did not know anything about the content or about the 
existence of the study.  
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learned for researchers is to avoid assuming that taxpayers can be reached just because 
some information is available in the revenue administration’s database. In our case, phone 
contact with taxpayers was almost always necessary to deliver the letters. In practice, this 
means that researchers may need to carefully select a sample of taxpayers that are more 
likely to be reached with the information available. For example, restricting the analysis to a 
specific geographical area, usually the capital city or province, may help. Going forward, our 
larger-scale experiment limits the sample to those taxpayers who registered recently, to 
make sure the information on the database is not too outdated. Although this is not ideal from 
a research design perspective, as it may introduce selection bias, it is a pragmatic response 
to the specific constraints present in many low-income countries.  
 
Finally, we know from informal conversations with the RRA that several taxpayers reacted to 
the letter by getting in contact with RRA staff. Although the RRA’s call centre was explicitly 
briefed to collect information from those who enquired about the letter, only a relatively low 
number of calls were received through this official channel. This is most likely a reflection of 
broader challenges faced by the call centre, such as few staff members, long waiting times, 
and incentives to keep calls short to improve performance. As a result, several taxpayers 
enquired about the letters in other, informal ways. Some of them visited the RRA 
headquarters in person, while two approached the Office of the Commissioner General 
directly. From a researcher perspective, these interactions introduce some element of 
uncertainty as they may affect revisions in unpredictable ways. We tried to limit this issue by 
keeping the information about the research project strictly confidential to a small group of 
people within the RRA. Therefore, many RRA officials who might have been contacted by 
taxpayers did not know that the letters were part of a study – a fact that may have 
discouraged taxpayers to react. However, these responses confirm that the letters did 
generate a reaction, even if it did not necessarily result in a revision. The econometric 
analysis is not suitable to capture these various reactions, which however provide a much 
more nuanced understanding of the effect of our intervention. For this reason, we 
commissioned a companion paper from the RRA’s research staff to collect such responses,12 
adding to the picture emerging from the econometric analysis on the effect of the letters.  
 
 
3 Empirical strategy 
 
Based on the design and sample described in Section 1, we estimate the following equation, 
where i indicates the taxpayer: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑏2(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 𝑥 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑖) +  𝑋𝑖  𝑏3 
 
Revisions are captured using the two variables for revisions, the binary one, indicating 
whether the taxpayer revised, and the amount of revision (see Table B.1 and more details 
below). The equation specified above includes an interaction term between the treatment 
and the dummy identifying large taxpayers, in addition to the treatment variable. This choice 
is based on our initial consultations with the RRA, where we developed the hypothesis that 
there may be fundamental differences in the reactions by small and large taxpayers. While 
the latter are already well informed about tax laws, the former may not be. Moreover, it is 
more likely that a small taxpayer would react to an RRA communication out of fear of being 
caught, while this would not be the case for large taxpayers who are more knowledgeable 
about their tax affairs. Finally, we include a set of controls X, namely: whether a taxpayer is 
classified as large; the degree of riskiness (0 = non-risky, 1 = risky, 2 = risky and audited); 
the lagged dependent variable (referring to the same five-month period a year earlier); tax 
                                                        
12 This companion paper is currently forthcoming in the ICTD Working Paper Series.  
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payable at the baseline; and the amount of under-reported tax due if the taxpayer was 
subject to an audit.  
 
Based on this specification, the equation is estimated using three empirical models. An 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is used when the dependent variable is equal to the 
level of revision. By using the amount in level, the resulting coefficient on the treatment 
variables (treatment and the interaction with large) can be directly interpreted as additional 
tax resulting from the revisions by the treated. A probit model is estimated when revisions are 
measured using a binary variable that is equal to one if the taxpayer revised the declaration 
at least once positively, so that the new tax due is higher than the originally declared tax. The 
dependent variable takes the value zero if the taxpayers did not revise or revised negatively. 
In our third model, we define the dependent variable as the logarithm of the level of revision, 
because it is less affected by outliers than the level variable. As the logarithm is only defined 
for strictly positive values, this estimation does not consider negative revisions.13 Since the 
majority of taxpayers do not revise their declarations, we add 1 RWF to the level of revision. 
Thus, the dependent variable takes the value ln(1) if the level of revision is zero. Since a 
large number of taxpayers do not revise their declarations, the dependent variable revisions 
are also censored at zero and consequently, we use tobit estimation for the logarithmic 
specification. For the probit and tobit models, we report both the latent variable coefficients 
and marginal effects.  
 
We present both an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis and estimation of the local average 
treatment effect (LATE). The former analysis is based on the original treatment assignment 
and does not take into account whether a taxpayer actually received our letter or not. On the 
other hand, the LATE estimation considers that some taxpayers in the treatment group have 
not received the letter by using an IV technique. In particular, it uses the original treatment 
assignment as an instrumental variable for the actual treatment and thus provides an 
estimate of the impact of the treatment on compliers (see Bloom 2008; Angrist and Pischke 
2009). Intuitively, the LATE estimation reflects the potential impact of the intervention in case 
the RRA is able to fully implement the experimental design (i.e. successfully deliver letters to 
all selected taxpayers), while the ITT analysis shows the effectiveness of the treatment given 
the current circumstances. As the letter receipt cannot be mandated, the ITT estimation may 
be more policy relevant than the LATE analysis (Bloom 2008). Based on these 
considerations, we focus on the ITT results, while we briefly discuss LATE in the text and 
report results in the appendices.   
 
 
4 Data and description of revisions 
 
The analysis is based on administrative data from anonymised taxpayer records obtained 
from the RRA. On the one hand, our dataset presents some advantages over other sources 
of data, which are described in more detail in Mascagni et al. 2016a. Perhaps the most 
important one is that it allows us to capture ‘real-life’ taxpaying behaviour, rather than 
attitudes. This feature is enhanced by the fact that all communications with taxpayers, most 
notably the letter, were coming from the RRA rather than from researchers. Moreover, 
taxpayers’ behaviour has real monetary consequences. On the other hand, taxpayer records 
do not include all the variables that we would ideally include in the analysis. For example, we 
do not have information on the gender of business owners, or on whether they are foreign 
nationals or locals. We also cannot establish with precision where the company is operating 
in practice, although we know where it is registered for tax purposes. Notwithstanding these 
                                                        
13 Our estimation results are very similar if we define the dependent variable in such a way that it takes the value zero in case of 
negative revisions (compare results in Table 2 and Table D.3 to Table E.1). 
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drawbacks, our data, coupled with experimental methods, allow us to explore quasi-voluntary 
tax compliance in a more rigorous way than previously possible in Africa.  
 
Our dataset includes the variables available in tax declarations, such as various definitions of 
income (i.e. turnover, gross profit, taxable income), whether the taxpayer is small or large 
(according to the registration at the taxpayer office), and the location of the tax centre where 
the taxpayer is registered. A description of all the variables used in this paper is reported in 
Appendix B. Crucially, our data allows us to track taxpayers in time through unique identifiers 
that still preserve the confidentiality and privacy of taxpayers – i.e. researchers who are 
external to the RRA cannot trace any specific observation in the dataset to a specific 
individual or company. Our dataset spans five years, from 2011 to 2015, with 2014 used as a 
baseline for randomisation and 2015 used to capture revisions.  
 
4.1 Revisions 
 
While other variables follow fairly standard and straightforward definitions, it is important to 
report here more details on our key outcome variable: revisions. First of all, we only consider 
revisions that happened in the five-month period after our experimental intervention, from 8 
September 2015 to 7 February 2016. The cut-off date was decided based on three 
considerations. First, given the delays in implementing the intervention (see Section 2), we 
had to shift our window for revisions by one month to leave enough time for taxpayers to 
respond. Second, there is no natural cut-off date that is common to all the tax types 
considered here, as they follow different timelines. While PIT and CIT declarations are filed 
once a year between 1 January and 31 March, VAT declarations are filed monthly or 
quarterly depending on firm size. Still, most PIT and CIT declarations are usually filed 
towards the end of the filing period, therefore minimising the overlap with our five-month 
window. Third, we wanted to close the window before starting to implement our next and 
larger-scale experiment, which also involved sending messages to taxpayers (see 
Introduction). We are confident that our choice is sensible based on these considerations 
and on the observation that most responses happen right after the intervention. However, we 
also check for the robustness of our results by using a four-month window as an alternative.  
 
Based on these considerations, we constructed two variables related to revisions. The first 
one captures the amount of revisions, calculated as the difference between the tax due from 
the original declaration and any revisions made by the taxpayer in the five-month period. To 
avoid simply capturing mistakes in the process of filing, we do not consider revisions that 
happen on the same day as the declaration. In other words, when there are multiple entries 
on the day of the declaration, we take the tax due from the latest revision on that day as the 
amount of the original declaration. Subsequent revisions are always measured compared to 
the original declaration, so that our variable captures the cumulative amount of all revisions 
that the taxpayer may have made. Multiple revisions within the same year are not common 
for PIT and CIT, but they are more so for VAT where declarations are monthly or quarterly, 
and so potentially revisions are, too. Finally, we only use revisions that occur at least seven 
days before an audit, which is the time of the audit notification, after which lower sanctions 
are no longer applicable. By doing this, we can isolate the effect of our letter from taxpayers’ 
responses to the audit notifications. Our conversations with the RRA staff revealed that 
taxpayers often respond to the audit notification by revising their accounts, hoping to ‘limit the 
damage’ from the audit. However, as described in Section 1.1, any action taken by the 
taxpayer after the receipt of the audit notification is not valid for the purpose of determining 
sanctions. The second outcome is a binary variable taking the value of one when a taxpayer 
has revised at least once in the five-month period and zero otherwise. We disaggregate this 
binary variable further to separate positive and negative revisions.  
 
Although revisions can be indicative of quasi-voluntary compliance, there are other possible 
motivations. For example, taxpayers may make changes as a result of new information 
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becoming available, because they are trying to decrease their tax burden ex-post, or to 
correct previous mistakes. As a result, revisions can be either positive or negative. Table 1 
reports the percentage of taxpayers who made at least one positive revision in the calendar 
year 2014, the baseline year, and splits that number into those whose revised tax due was 
higher and lower than the original declaration. Consultations with the RRA revealed the 
perception that negative revisions are often related to avoidance or evasion. For example, 
we heard anecdotal evidence of taxpayers negatively revising their CIT account to 
compensate for unexpected, or unexpectedly high, VAT payments or for failed refunds.  
 
Table 1 also reveals that most revisions concern VAT, which is true both in percentage and 
absolute terms (for the latter, see table D.1 in Appendix D).14 There are at least three 
motivations to explain why more revisions occur for VAT. First, enforcement efforts have 
been particularly focussed on VAT in recent years, for example with the introduction of 
electronic billing machines. This may have increased taxpayers’ perceptions of the 
probability of detection for VAT specifically, therefore pushing them to come forward and 
reveal those under-declared incomes that they feel are more easily uncovered by audits. 
Second, the fact that VAT is filed monthly may make it easier for taxpayers to revise it, as the 
relevant information is more recent and clearer in their memories. In contrast, at the time of 
the intervention, CIT and PIT declarations were filed five to eight months earlier. Third, 
taxpayers have only fifteen days to prepare their monthly VAT return, as opposed to three 
months for PIT and CIT. Since they have less time to prepare and review VAT returns, 
taxpayers may end up revising them more often to correct mistakes or make amendments.  
 
 
Table 1 Revisions in the year 2014 (before our intervention) 
Tax type % revised once % positive % negative 
CIT 3.9 2.6 1.3 
PIT 9.9 8.2 1.6 
VAT 29.9 19.3 10.6 
Total 22.7 15.3 7.3 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on RRA dataset for the calendar year 2014. 
 
 
 
5 Econometric results  
 
We start the analysis by testing whether there are statistically significant differences in 
revisions between the treatment and control groups, after the intervention. For both our 
outcome variables, we test whether the control and treatment groups display a statistically 
different behaviour in terms of revisions. The results of these initial tests are reported in 
Appendix D. As far as the binary variable is concerned, Fisher’s tests reported in Table D.1 
(Appendix D) confirm that negative revisions are more common in the control group, while 
positive revisions are more frequent in the treatment group. Therefore it seems that letters 
may have a twofold effect: they increase the number of positive revisions (potentially as a 
result of previous under-reporting) and they make negative revisions less likely (a potential 
deterrent effect of the treatment message). These differences are statistically significant 
amongst revisers and borderline significant amongst all taxpayers. However, the number of 
revisions in our sample is quite small.  
 
                                                        
14 Note that PIT and CIT taxpayers should not necessarily be registered for VAT (roughly 26 per cent of PIT and 80 per cent of 
CIT filers in our sample declare VAT), so the number of observations is lower when considering only VAT rather than all tax 
types.  
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Looking at the amount of revisions in the two groups, the tests reported in Table D.2 
(Appendix D) confirm that the amount of revisions is negative in the control group, but 
positive in the treatment group. In the five-month period considered, only a small share of 
taxpayers revised their declaration at least once: 16 in the control group and 17 in the 
treatment group. Although the average revised tax due amongst all taxpayers is relatively 
low, due to a large number with zero revisions, the average among revisers is substantial: an 
average negative amount of RWF 27.9 million (US$34,091) in the control group and a 
positive RWF 1.3 million (US$1,559) in the treatment group.15 These differences are 
statistically significant when the distribution is considered, but only borderline significant at 
the 10 per cent level when we test for equal means. However, given the number of taxpayers 
in our treatment and control groups, the minimum detectable standardised difference 
between the treatment and control for a one-sided t-test is 2.5 to achieve a power of 80 per 
cent under the five per cent significance level (which translates to a mean difference of more 
than RWF 730,000 (US$892)).16 In other words, the relatively lower level of significance on 
the equal means test could also be a consequence of the low power of the t-test. 
 
Table 2 shows the intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis, which is based on the original 
randomisation – regardless of whether the treatment was actually received. The ITT analysis 
identifies the causal effect of the offer of the letter, considering that some taxpayers rejected 
the treatment or could not be reached (see Angrist and Pischke 2009). An OLS model is 
estimated in column 1 of Table 2, where the dependent variable is equal to the amount of 
revision in levels. A probit model is estimated in column 2, where the dependent variable is 
equal to one if the taxpayer revised the declaration at least once positively, so that the new 
tax due is higher than the originally declared tax. The dependent variable takes the value 
zero if the taxpayer did not revise or only revised negatively.17 Column 3 estimates a tobit 
model, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount of revision, as discussed 
in Section 3. All regressions include a constant and control for size, riskiness, and the tax 
due for the previous fiscal year, as well as lagged revisions and principals, as discussed in 
Section 3 (also see Appendix B for a description of the variables). The coefficient estimates 
on these control variables are omitted to improve readability. We estimate the treatment 
effects both considering all tax types (Panel A) and only VAT (Panel B), where most 
revisions occur.  
 
The treatment effect based on the OLS regression (column 1 of Table 2) is not statistically 
significant for taxpayers of any size. As discussed in the previous section, this may be a 
result of low statistical power, given the low level but high standard deviation of revisions, 
and the relatively small sample size. In other words, we do not know whether our estimated 
treatment effect is truly non-significant or whether the lack of significance is caused by a lack 
of power.18 Nevertheless, the OLS coefficients would be interpreted as follows: the average 
revision level for small taxpayers in the treatment group is estimated to be around RWF 
36,000 (US$44) higher than in the control group (see coefficient in the first row). For large 
                                                        
15 While the average revision of revisers is close to the RWF 1 million (US$1,222) mentioned in the example of the letter, no 
taxpayer actually revised their declaration by this amount (the closest revision to RWF 1 million was RWF 1.75 million 
(US$2,138). In contrast, checking the distribution of revisions, there does not seem to be any form of bunching of revisions.  
16 To calculate the minimum detectable effect size under 80 per cent power, we used the following parameters: the number of 
taxpayers in our treatment and control groups is 995 and 982, respectively. The mean of the control group is –471,799 in the 
same five-month period in the previous year (see Table C.1), while the corresponding standard deviations are 8,307,536 and 
3,969,788 in the control and treatment groups, respectively. 
17 If we redefine the dependent variable to take the value one if the aggregate revisions of the taxpayer in the five-month period 
are positive and zero otherwise, the results are almost identical and the conclusions remain the same. Results available from 
the authors upon request. 
18 We do not have geographical information which we could exploit for the estimation of cluster robust standard errors. If we 
cluster the standard errors on the tax centre (using a T-distribution with G–L degrees of freedom, where G is the number of 
clusters and L the number of coefficients), we find a weakly significant treatment effect on large taxpayers. However, the 
relatively low number of tax centres in our sample (10) could lead to severely downward biased cluster robust standard errors 
(e.g. Bell and McCaffrey 2002 and Cameron and Miller 2015). Therefore, we generally use White-heteroscedasticity corrected 
standard errors in our regressions. However, the main conclusion regarding the probit and tobit model shown in Table 2 remains 
the same if we use cluster robust standard errors.  
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taxpayers the difference between the control and treatment groups would be almost RWF 2.7 
million (US$3,299) (i.e. the sum of coefficients in the first and second row). These differences 
between the revised tax amounts in the treatment and control groups, if significant, could be 
used to calculate the gross revenue gain resulting from the experiment, which would be RWF 
379 million (or about US$464,000) in our case.19 However, the fact that the coefficients are 
largely non-significant calls for much caution in interpreting these estimates and prevents us 
from taking them as anything but indicative.  
 
Table 2: Regression results (ITT) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Probit  Tobit  
Panel A: All tax types 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
Marginal treatment effects, small taxpayers: 
Predicted probability 
Effect of censored revisions 
Effect conditional on positive revision 
 
Marginal treatment effects, large taxpayers: 
Predicted probability 
Effect of censored revisions 
Effect conditional on positive revision 
 
36,044 
(31,010) 
 
2,619,738 
(2,234,682) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.65**  
(0.26) 
 
–0.72 
(0.48) 
 
 
0.007** 
 
 
 
 
–0.001 
27.0** 
(10.8) 
 
–29.8* 
(17.9) 
 
 
 
0.07*** 
2.01*** 
 
 
 
–0.01 
–0.22 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,939 
Panel B: VAT 
 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
Marginal treatment effects, small taxpayers: 
Predicted probability 
Effect of censored revisions 
Effect conditional on positive revision 
 
Marginal treatment effects, large taxpayers: 
Predicted probability 
Effect of censored revisions 
Effect conditional on positive revision 
  
 
74,668 
(56,356) 
 
2,598,608 
(2,377,545) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.63**  
(0.27) 
 
–0.69 
(0.48) 
 
 
0.013** 
 
 
 
 
–0.001 
 
26.0** 
(11.1) 
 
–28.5 
(17.8) 
 
 
 
0.15*** 
2.29*** 
 
 
 
–0.01 
–0.22 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,162 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are evaluated at the 
mean. The dependent variable is the level of revision in column (1), the binary revisions variable in column (2), and the 
logarithm of the level of revision in column (3). All regressions include a constant and controls for size, riskiness, the latest 
available tax due, as well as revision and principal of the previous fiscal year.  
 
The probit and tobit estimations show that small firms are more likely to revise positively 
when they receive the letter (column 2) and, when they do, the amount revised is higher 
(column 3). We can only detect a significant treatment effect for small taxpayers, while the 
letters did not have an influence on large ones. One potential explanation is that large 
taxpayers already know about the benefits of revisions before receiving the letter, as they are 
                                                        
19 The revenue gain for small taxpayers is calculated by multiplying the coefficient on the treatment variable by the number of 
small taxpayers in the treatment group: 36,044 x 864. Similarly, for large taxpayers the revenue gain would be the sum of the 
two coefficients multiplied by the number of large taxpayers: (36,044 + 2,619,738) x 131. The total revenue gain is the sum of 
the two. 
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more likely to have better knowledge of tax law or access to good tax advisers. In contrast, 
small taxpayers may have previously not been aware of the financial benefits (i.e. lower 
penalties) of revising wrong declarations.20 Therefore, the differences between the control 
and treatment groups are largely driven by the reactions of smaller taxpayers.  
 
In particular, those taxpayers in the treatment group have more than a one percentage point 
higher probability of making a positive revision of their original tax due than taxpayers in the 
control group (see marginal treatment effects in column 2). If a small taxpayer is in the 
control group, the predicted probability of making a positive revision is only around 0.3 per 
cent, based on evaluating the marginal effects for the treatment and control groups 
separately. In comparison, the same probability of small taxpayers in the treatment group is 
around 1.6 per cent. Therefore, small taxpayers in the treatment group are more than five 
times as likely to revise than small taxpayers in the control group.  
 
When small taxpayers revise their declarations, the revisions in the treatment group are more 
than 200 per cent higher than the revisions in the control group (last row of marginal 
treatment effects in column 3). Therefore, these effects are relatively sizeable, although 
positive revisions remain a relatively uncommon action amongst Rwandan taxpayers.  
 
To complement the ITT analysis, we estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) 
using the original treatment assignment as an instrument for actual treatment. By doing this, 
LATE estimates the effect of the treatment on the treated, or compliers, taking into account 
that some taxpayers in the treatment group have not received the letter. It represents the 
causal effect of the treatment on the compliers (see Angrist and Pischke 2009, p.136). The 
LATE estimations in Table D.3 (Appendix D) mirror the results of the ITT analysis, while both 
the coefficients and the standard errors increase in size. First, as expected, the effect of the 
intervention on revisions is higher for those taxpayers in the treatment group that have 
certainly received the letters. Comparing the OLS estimates (Table 2) and the corresponding 
LATE results (Table D.3) confirms that the treatment-effect size almost doubles: from RWF 
36,000 (US$44) to RWF 63,000 (US$77) for small taxpayers and from RWF 2.7 million 
(US$3,299) to more than RWF 4 million (US$4,888) for large taxpayers. Second, the 
increase in the standard errors is a result of the IV regressions, which also depends on the fit 
of the first stage estimation. Still, IV techniques are necessary to estimate the LATE, since 
standard OLS, probit, and tobit models would lead to inconsistent estimates.  
 
The ITT and LATE analyses are therefore largely consistent, both in terms of sign and 
statistical significance for small taxpayers, thus also supporting robustness. These results, 
taken together, suggest that information letters could be an effective way to encourage 
taxpayers to comply by making revisions more likely and leading to the declaration of 
previously unreported income. Moreover, conditional on making a revision, the amount of tax 
revised is higher once taxpayers receive the information letter. While these findings seem to 
suggest that communication strategies of this type can be effective, particularly for small 
taxpayers, we cannot determine if this effect is due to the information on sanctions included 
in the letter or to the fact of receiving a letter. The latter is likely to have increased taxpayers’ 
perception of the probability of detection, which is one of the key determinants of compliance, 
especially because letters were delivered by auditors and in a context in which this type of 
communication from the RRA is relatively uncommon. This is particularly true for small 
taxpayers, who are also very unlikely to be audited and generally have less contact with the 
RRA (Mascagni et al. 2016a). Such an unusual event is likely to have affected perceptions 
about enforcement efforts and generally led taxpayers to realise that they are on the RRA’s 
radar. This may have pushed taxpayers to revise their accounts, potentially along with the 
                                                        
20 If we compare revisions of small taxpayers to the revisions in the same period one year before, the number of negative 
revisions is unchanged (10). However, the number of positive revisions increased from 8 to 11 (which is an almost 40 per cent 
increase). In comparison, large taxpayers tend tended to revise generally less often than in the year before. Especially, the 
negative revisions decreased from 13 to 6. (The positive revisions decreased from 9 to 6.) 
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encouragement provided by information on lower fines for voluntary revisions. The key point, 
as recognised elsewhere in this paper, is that we cannot distinguish the channel of our 
observed effect.  
 
5.1 Robustness and caveats  
 
We have checked the robustness of our results to the choice of the five-month time window, 
since this decision is somewhat arbitrary. We have run again the regression analysis using a 
four-month window, from 8 September 2015 until 7 January 2016. The main advantage of 
this alternative window is that it minimises the overlap with the CIT and PIT tax filing period, 
although this overlap is not expected to matter much since most revisions occur for VAT. The 
results are reported in Appendix D. Using this window, the results are generally similar, but 
less robust due to the slightly lower number of revisions in this shorter period. For example, 
the VAT declaration for December 2015 is only due on 15 January 2016 and therefore any 
revisions to that declaration can only happen after that date. Notwithstanding these 
considerations, we are confident that our results are not determined by the choice of the five-
month time window.  
 
Although we are confident in our results, three caveats in particular should be noted. The first 
one is related to our outcome variable, which requires a relatively strong change in behaviour 
on the part of taxpayers: to voluntarily come forward and disclose previously un-declared 
income. Although our letter seems to nudge this type of behaviour, only a few taxpayers 
reacted. Secondly, although we made every effort to make the letter as simple and salient as 
possible, the explanation of sanctions is necessarily quite technical and complex. Therefore, 
some taxpayers may have failed to fully understand the contents and, as a result, may have 
ignored it. Third, as already mentioned throughout the paper, we cannot distinguish the effect 
of the letter’s contents from the very fact of receiving a letter, which in itself may have 
increased the perceived probability of an audit.  
 
These caveats, together with the fact that taxpayers are not used to receiving letters from the 
RRA, suggest that the intervention may have created some confusion amongst taxpayers. A 
companion paper,21 prepared by the RRA, collected qualitative feedback from taxpayers on 
their perceptions and their reactions to the letter. The anecdotes collected there confirm that 
some taxpayers were not sure how to react to the letter, although they did have some 
unreported income to declare. Therefore, we also checked whether they may have changed 
their declarations behaviour, in addition to making the revisions. In other words, it may be 
that a taxpayer does not feel comfortable disclosing previous evasion, but she may be more 
compliant in the future. Although we do not find any evidence of this behaviour in this pilot 
experiment, we further explore nudges on declarations in our larger experiment (Mascagni et 
al. 2016b).  
 
Despite the caveats described above, the analysis still yielded results that are both 
significant and in line with our knowledge of the Rwandan taxpaying environment. 
Furthermore, the qualitative taxpayer feedback confirmed that the letters indeed provoked a 
reaction, even if that did not translate into a revision. Since this experiment is a pilot, the 
caveat observed here, as well as the lessons learned summarised in the next section, fed 
into our larger-scale experiment.  
 
 
  
                                                        
21 This paper will be available as an ICTD Working Paper. 
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6 Conclusions  
 
This paper reports key findings from a pilot field experiment on tax compliance, which to the 
best of our knowledge is the first publicly available evidence of this type from Africa. As such, 
a key objective of the paper is to provide lessons learned on implementing this type of study 
in low-income countries, as well as reporting initial econometric results. As far as lessons 
learned are concerned, Section 2 summarises some characteristic features of low-income 
countries that researchers need to factor into their research plans and design. These include 
administrative constraints; the effectiveness of physical letters, for which processes are not 
streamlined; and shortcomings in the taxpayer registry. Although the success rate of our 
letter delivery exercise compared relatively well with other similar studies, sending a large 
number of letters is a burden for the revenue administration, both in terms of letter 
preparation and delivery. This makes it particularly important for low-income countries to 
experiment with other delivery methods. For example, our larger field experiment includes 
emails and SMS, along with physical letters (Mascagni et al. 2016). Despite these 
challenges, this pilot confirms that large-scale field experiments are indeed feasible in Africa, 
especially when the local revenue authority is committed to the project.  
 
In terms of econometric results, the analysis reported in Section 5 suggests that information 
letters can be an effective way to nudge taxpayers into complying more. We used revisions 
as an indicator of voluntary compliance, which represents a departure from the literature. Our 
analysis shows that letters work by both reducing negative revisions, which seem to be a 
way to avoid or evade taxes, and by increasing the likelihood of positive revisions. However, 
we cannot determine if this effect occurs through an increase of the perceived probability of 
detection (the ‘stick’) or through encouragement provided by lower fines (the ‘carrot’). This 
highlights the importance of including a control letter, in addition to a no-letter control group. 
Although our key results are generally significant, they rely on a relatively small number of 
revisions in the period considered. Therefore, they should be taken with some caution, 
especially when attempting to translate them into precise policy recommendations.  
 
Nonetheless, we can highlight some broad implications for policymakers. On a general level, 
the results suggest that communication strategies can be an effective way to improve 
voluntary compliance. This is particularly the case for small taxpayers, who probably have 
less information about the tax system and less access to good tax advisers. Importantly, 
such communication strategies are in line with the RRA’s vision to go beyond audits in its 
efforts to increase compliance and tax revenues. However, our results are not sufficient to 
recommend scaling up the precise intervention tested here to a larger group of taxpayers. 
Revisions are a very specific aspect of non-compliance, although our evidence suggests that 
they may indeed be used as a way to avoid or evade taxes. Still, nudging this specific 
behaviour may not be the most effective strategy to increase compliance. The number of 
revisions we observe in the period after the letter is still low. Moreover, it is difficult to assess 
if our intervention would be worthwhile on a larger scale, since the lack of statistical 
significance in the OLS regression makes it hard to obtain reliable estimates of the total 
revenue gain. Nudges influencing declaration behaviour and tax payments are likely to be a 
more effective and more profitable strategy for revenue authorities.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A Experimental letter 
 
Figure A.1 Body of the letter  
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Figure A.2 Back of the letter 
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Appendix B Description of variables 
 
Table B.1 Summary of variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Description 
Tax due  
(in RWF) 
Total tax liability for CIT, PIT, and VAT for the latest available fiscal year (in 
RWF) 
Revision  
(amount) 
Difference between the tax due from the original declaration and any 
revisions made by the taxpayer in our five-month investigation period (in 
RWF, before receiving an audit notification) 
Revision  
(binary) 
Binary variable that takes the value one if the taxpayer positively revised 
the declaration at least once in our five-month investigation period (before 
receiving an audit notification) 
Treatment  
(binary) 
Binary variable indicating whether the taxpayer was in the treatment group 
or not 
Large 
(binary) 
Binary variable that takes the value one if the taxpayer is registered at RRA 
as a large or top-medium firm, and zero otherwise 
Riskiness  
(categorical) 
Categorical variable that takes the value zero for non-risky firms, one for 
non-audited but risky firms, and two for audited firms 
Principal  
(in RWF) 
The aggregated under-reported tax due for CIT, PIT, and VAT, which was 
discovered through audits in the five-month period one year before our 
experiment  
 
 
 
Appendix C Balance tests of treatment and control groups 
 
Table C.1 Balance tests of treatment and control groups at baseline 
    
(1) 
Variable 
(2)  
Control 
n=982 
 
(3)  
Treatment 
n=995  
 
(4)  
Equal distribution  
p-value 
    
Large 
Small 
 
132 
850 
131 
864 
 
 
 
0.895 
 
Non-risky 
Risky (no audit) 
Risky (audit) 
 
 
CIT 
PIT 
VAT 
 
Real regime 
Lump sum 
Flat amount 
 
 
Lagged negative revisions 
Lagged zero revisions 
Lagged positive revisions 
 
 
722 
349 
133 
 
 
563 
332 
629 
 
508 
261 
23 
 
 
11 
964 
7 
505 
354 
136 
 
 
568 
338 
622 
 
506 
279 
24 
 
 
10 
978 
7 
 
 
 
0.998 
 
0.928 
0.962 
0.484 
 
 
 
 
0.803 
 
 
 
 
0.964 
In RWF: 
Latest tax due 
Lagged principal 
Lagged revisions 
 
71,453,768 
121,071 
–471,799 
 
35,121,734 
–18,264 
76,253 
 
0.945 
0.774 
0.857 
    
Notes: n indicates the number of observations. For categorical variables, column (4) displays the p-value of the two-
sided Fisher’s exact test. The null hypothesis is that there is no association between the treatment and the category of 
taxpayers indicated in column (1). For continuous variables, column (4) shows the p-value of the Mann-Whitney test. The 
null hypothesis is that the distribution of the continuous variable is the same in the control and treatment groups.   
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Appendix D Initial tests and LATE results  
 
Table D.1 Differences in the number of revisers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Control 
Treatment 
 
Fisher’s test 
p-value 
(all taxpayers) 
Fisher’s test  
p-value 
(revisers) 
Panel A: all tax types 
 
Negative revisions 
No revisions 
Positive revisions 
 
 
10 
968 
4 
 
6 
978 
11 
 
 
 
0.122 
 
 
 
0.049 
Panel B: VAT 
 
Negative revisions 
No revisions 
Positive revisions 
 
9 
616 
4 
5 
606 
11 
 
 
 
 
0.108 
 
 
 
 
 
0.048 
 
Notes: Column (3) displays the p-value of the one-sided Fisher’s exact test. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
association between the treatment and the sign of revision. Column (3) considers the frequency of revisers (negative and 
positive) as well as non-revisers. Column (4) only considers the frequency of revisers (negative and positive). Fisher’s 
test is used to test the null hypothesis that there is no association between the treatment and the sign of revision. 
Fisher’s test is preferable to its parametric equivalent to compare frequencies, the chi-square test, if there are small cell 
sizes, as in our case. It does not rely on assumptions about the underlying distribution of revisions, unlike the chi-square 
test.  
 
Table D.2 Differences in the amount of revised tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Control Treatment 
Equal means 
p-value 
 
Equal 
distribution 
p-value 
Panel A: all tax types 
All taxpayers 
 
 
 
–397,787 
(337,919) 
n=982 
 
22,358 
(24,940) 
n=995 
 
0.106 
 
0.048 
Revisers 
–27,901,921 
(23,353,409) 
n=14 
1,308,624 
(1,468,516) 
n=17 
 
0.089 0.029 
Panel B: VAT 
All VAT payers 
 
 
–591,579 
(526,733) 
n=629 
 
41,604  
(39,459) 
n=622 
 
0.117 
 
0.040 
Revisers  
–28,623,337 
(25,212,526) 
n=13 
1,617,363 
(1,528,414) 
n=16 
 
0.097 0.028 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. n indicates the number of observations in the control and treatment groups. The 
null hypothesis of the one-sided t-test shown in column (3) is that the level of revisions is the same in the control and 
treatment groups 
. The null hypothesis of the Mann-Whitney test shown in column (4) is that the distribution of revisions is the same. The 
Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric correspondent to the independent samples t-test. It does not require assumptions 
about normality, but only that the dependent variable, revisions, is ordinal.  
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Table D.3 LATE analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
IV IV-probit  IV-tobit  
Panel A: All tax types 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
62,086 
(53,317) 
 
3,983,033 
(3,405,672) 
 
1.09**  
(0.51) 
 
–1.24 
(0.81) 
45.6* 
(23.8) 
 
–60.0 
(32.5) 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,939 
Panel B: VAT 
 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
116,837 
(87,587) 
 
3,904,613 
(3,573,086) 
 
 
0.98**  
(0.48) 
 
–1.11 
(0.79) 
 
40.2* 
(21.9) 
 
–45.2 
(30.8) 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,162 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An IV regression is estimated in column (1), 
where the dependent variable is equal to the level of revision. A two-step IV-probit model is estimated in column (2), 
where the dependent variable is equal to one if the taxpayer positively revised the declaration at least once. Column 
(3) estimates a two-step IV-tobit model, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the level of revision. All 
regressions include a constant and controls for size, riskiness, and the latest available tax due, as well as revision and 
principal of the previous fiscal year. Note that columns (2) and (3) do not include marginal effects because we used 
two-step probit and tobit estimators, as the alternative maximum likelihood estimators had difficulties in converging due 
to the presence of multiple endogenous variables (treatment and treatment x large). This estimator is not directly 
comparable to the standard probit and tobit based on maximum likelihood, but is rather used to test for statistical 
significance. We could obtain marginal effects comparable to Table 2 if we used maximum likelihood and ran the 
regressions IV-probit/tobit only for small taxpayers. 
 
 
Appendix E Robustness tests 
 
Table E.1 Tobit analysis without missing values  
(dependent value is zero if negative revisions) 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
Tobit IV-tobit  
Panel A: All tax types 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
19.3** 
(8.8) 
 
–21.9 
(16.5) 
 
32.4* 
(18.4) 
 
–37.5 
(28.5) 
 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,977 
Panel B: VAT 
 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
17.9* 
(9.2) 
 
–20.2 
(16.5) 
 
 
 
28.0* 
(17.0) 
 
–32.5 
(27.3) 
 
 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,196 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. A tobit model is estimated in column (1), where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the level of revision. Column (2) estimates a two-step IV-tobit model, where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the level of revision. In case the level of revisions is negative, the dependent 
variable takes the value zero. All regressions include a constant and controls for size, riskiness, and the latest available 
tax due, as well as revision and principal of the previous fiscal year. 
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Table E.2 ITT analysis with four-month window 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Probit  Tobit  
Panel A: All tax types 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
Marginal treatment effects, small taxpayers: 
Predicted probability 
Effect of censored revisions 
Effect conditional on positive revision 
 
Significant effects for large taxpayers  
3,991 
(13,803) 
 
2,612,601 
(2,231,082) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
0.52**  
(0.26) 
 
–0.82 
(0.53) 
 
 
 
0.005** 
 
 
 
No 
21.9* 
(11.3) 
 
–33.1 
(20.3) 
 
 
 
 
0.06** 
1.70** 
 
No 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,939 
Panel B: VAT 
 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
Marginal treatment effects, small 
taxpayers: 
Predicted probability 
Effect of censored revisions 
Effect conditional on positive revision 
 
Significant effects for large taxpayers  
 
15,669 
(25,625) 
 
2,625,122 
(2,380,975) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
0.47**  
(0.28) 
 
–0.78 
(0.54) 
 
 
 
0.009* 
 
 
 
No 
 
19.8* 
(11.8) 
 
–30.7 
(20.3) 
 
 
 
 
0.10* 
1.70* 
 
No 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,162 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean. An OLS model 
is estimated in column (1), where the dependent variable is equal to the level of revision. A probit model is estimated in 
column (2), where the dependent variable is equal to one if the taxpayer positively revised the declaration at least once. 
Column (3) estimates a tobit model, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the level of revision. All regressions 
include a constant and controls for size, riskiness, and the latest available tax due, as well as revision and principal of the 
previous fiscal year.  
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Table E.3 LATE analysis with four-month window 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
 
IV IV-probit  IV-tobit  
Panel A: All tax types 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
4,913 
(23,172) 
 
3,960,252 
(3,384,534) 
 
0.77  
(0.55) 
 
–4.53 
(216) 
32.8 
(24.0) 
 
–175.4 
(9,825) 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,977 
Yes 
1,939 
Panel B: VAT 
 
Treatment 
 
 
Treatment x large 
 
 
20,901 
(38,222) 
 
3,932,477 
(3,564,325) 
 
 
 
0.69  
(0.51) 
 
–4.44 
(201) 
 
28.6 
(22.1) 
 
–170.3 
(8,445) 
Other controls 
Observations 
Yes 
1196 
Yes 
1,196 
Yes 
1,162 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An IV regression is estimated in column (1), where the 
dependent variable is equal to the level of revision. A two-step IV-probit model is estimated in column (2), where the 
dependent variable is equal to one if the taxpayer positively revised the declaration at least once. Column 3 estimates a 
two-step IV-tobit model, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the level of revision. All regressions include a 
constant and controls for size, riskiness, and the latest available tax due, as well as revision and principal of the previous 
fiscal year. 
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